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I WISH THEY ALL COULD BE CALIFORNIA 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACTS:  
RETHINKING NEPA IN LIGHT OF  
CLIMATE CHANGE 
Conor O’Brien* 
Abstract: Scientific evidence indicates that the repercussions of climate 
change are numerous, severe, and result from human activity. One 
possible method of curbing climate change may lie with the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which requires that federal agencies 
gather and disclose information about the environmental impacts of their 
activities. Shortly after NEPA’s passage, California enacted the California 
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), a statute similar to NEPA addressing 
the environmental impacts of state and local agencies’ activities. One 
significant departure from NEPA was that CEQA not only required that 
agencies disclose the environmental impacts of their activities, but that 
they avoid significant impacts in many circumstances. This Note discusses 
why omitting this requirement from NEPA makes it less useful in address-
ing climate change than its California counterpart, compares NEPA to 
CEQA, and suggests changes which could make NEPA a more useful tool 
for regulating climate change. 
Introduction 
 In 2006, California Attorney General Bill Lockyer advised leaders 
of Orange County that construction of a massive freeway would not 
comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) unless 
the county adequately considered the effects of the freeway on global 
warming.1 It was the first significant attempt to address the issue of 
global warming under CEQA.2 The practice gained statewide notoriety 
the following year when Lockyer’s successor, Jerry Brown, sued San 
Bernardino County for failing to mitigate the impacts of climate 
change in the county’s plans to expand the region.3 In November 2007, 
the attorney general reached an agreement with the county wherein 
                                                                                                                      
* Symposium Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2008–09. 
1 Cheryl Miller, Climate Controllers: AG’s Green Lawyers Are Creating a Ripple Effect, Re-
corder (San Francisco, CA), Jan. 23, 2008, at 1, 6. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
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the county would estimate greenhouse emissions as far back as 1990, 
and take steps to mitigate current emissions.4 Since then, climate 
change has become a staple of regulation in California, particularly as it 
affects CEQA compliance.5 Prior to the San Bernardino action, Cali-
fornia’s Office of the Attorney General had experimented with novel 
tactics to address climate change, including an argument that vehicles’ 
greenhouse gas emissions constitute a public nuisance.6 
 California is not the only state to address climate change.7 In 
2007, Washington’s largest county passed legislation requiring county 
officials to consider climate change impacts during environmental 
reviews under its State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA).8 Numerous 
states have passed legislation similar to SEPA and CEQA.9 These laws 
are modeled largely on the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), which requires that federal agencies consider the environ-
mental impacts of their activities before implementing proposals.10 
 Creative tactics to address climate change are necessary on the 
state level due to a vacuum in federal enforcement.11 Although the im-
pact of climate change is becoming a concern for CEQA compliance, 
NEPA compliance has not required similar consideration.12 This Note 
                                                                                                                      
4 Debra Kahn, Bid to Link Land Use to Calif. Emissions Law Draws Fire, Greenwire, Sept. 
20, 2007, http://www.earthportal.org/news/?p=489. 
5 See Miller, supra note 1, at 6. 
6 See id. 
7 See, e.g., Bill McAuliffe & Paul Walsh, Midwest Leaders Agree on Plan to Reduce CO2: A 
Regional, Market-Based Pollution Strategy for Carbon Dioxide Mirrors an Earlier Effort to Reduce 
Acid Rain, Star Trib. (Minneapolis, MN), Nov. 16, 2007, at 10A. Nine governors of various 
Midwestern States, and the Canadian province of Manitoba, signed an accord vowing to 
reduce greenhouse gasses by implementing the first-ever state caps on emissions from 
power plants and factories. Id. 
8 See State Environmental Policy Act, Wash. Rev. Code. §§ 43.21C.010–.21C.914 (1998); 
Press Release, Seattle City Council, City Council Passes Landmark Climate Protection Law (Dec. 
3, 2007), available at http://www.seattle.gov/council/newsdetail.asp?ID=7969&Dept=28. 
9 See California Environmental Quality Act, Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 21000–21177 
(West 2007); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 43.21C.010–.21C.914; Philip Michael Ferester, Revitaliz-
ing the National Environmental Policy Act: Substantive Law Adaptations from NEPA’s Progeny, 16 
Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 207, 209 (1992). 
10 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2000); Fer-
ester, supra note 9, at 207–09. 
11 See Miller, supra note 1, at 6. The Office of Attorney General Jerry Brown office peti-
tioned the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to enact new agency rules on 
the impact ships and planes have on climate change. Id. Brown’s office is also suing the 
EPA in response to the agency’s decision to preclude California from curbing tailpipe 
emissions. Id. Massachusetts, along with a consortium of states, sued the EPA for taking the 
position that it had no authority to regulate certain greenhouse gas emissions under sec-
tion 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act. See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
12 See infra Part III.B. 
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compares and contrasts the language of NEPA and CEQA to show how 
each can or cannot be used to regulate climate change. It demonstrates 
that NEPA, on its own terms, requires consideration of the impacts of 
climate change when planning federal activities. Merely requiring such 
consideration under NEPA, however does not mean a federal project 
necessarily will contribute less to climate change.13 In contrast, CEQA 
provides guidance as to how NEPA can be amended and reinterpreted 
to become an effective tool for combating climate change.14 
 Part I discusses the scientific evidence supporting the existence 
of climate change and the role humans play in hastening it. Part II 
details NEPA, paying particular attention to its procedural require-
ments, and the extent to which interpretations of it have limited its 
effectiveness. Part III explains CEQA and highlights the substantive 
requirements it imposes on state and local agencies in California. Part 
IV compares NEPA to CEQA and identifies the changes necessary for 
NEPA to become a useful tool for regulating climate change. 
I. Climate Change: An Overview 
 Mounting evidence bolsters the hypothesis that an increase in the 
average surface temperature of Earth is adversely affecting its ability to 
sustain life.15 The negative effects of this warming pattern are numer-
ous.16 In addition to glacier recession and a substantial rise in sea levels, 
another likely effect of this phenomenon is an increase in tropical cy-
clone activity.17 Climate change is also the cause of longer and more 
intense droughts which affect increasingly large areas.18 According to 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), it is more 
likely than not that human activity has exacerbated these trends.19 
 The IPCC further concluded that eleven of the last twelve years 
were the warmest in global temperatures since 1850—the year data be-
came available.20 Based on this data, IPCC stated that, “Warming of the 
climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of 
                                                                                                                      
13 See Kevin T. Haroff & Katherine Kirwan Moore, Global Climate Change and the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.F. L. Rev. 155, 166 (2007). 
14 See infra Part IV. 
15 See Working Group 1 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
Summary for Policymakers 12–17 (2007), available at http://ipcc-wg1.ucar.edu/wg1/ 
Report/AR4WG1_Print_SPM.pdf [hereinafter IPCC]. 
16 See id. at 5–9. 
17 Id. at 5, 9. 
18 Id. at 8. 
19 Id. at 3. 
20 See id. at 5. 
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increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread 
melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea level.”21 Human 
activity—in particular the emission of greenhouse gasses into the at-
mosphere—is primarily responsible for this warming pattern.22 
 According to the IPCC, atmospheric concentrations of these 
greenhouse gasses—particularly carbon dioxide, methane, and ni-
trous oxide—increased significantly due to industrial and agricultural 
activities since 1750.23 Carbon dioxide, the most common greenhouse 
gas in the atmosphere, has increased primarily due to fossil fuel use 
and land-use change, while increases in methane and nitrous oxide 
are attributable primarily to widespread farming.24 Climate change is 
unique compared to other air pollution problems because the loca-
tion of greenhouse gas emissions is unimportant.25 While smog, for 
instance, tends to settle near its source, greenhouse gasses disperse 
throughout the atmosphere, and its effect is worldwide.26 
 Both private and state activity may contribute to climate change. 
A private actor may contribute by constructing a coal-burning power 
plant, which produces carbon dioxide.27 On a smaller scale, a private 
actor may contribute to climate change by clearing a forest to build a 
farm.28 Since trees play an important role in absorbing carbon diox-
ide, fewer trees means more unabsorbed carbon dioxide entering the 
atmosphere.29 The same actor may further contribute by breeding 
methane-emitting livestock on the recently cleared area.30 
 Of course, the state may indirectly contribute to greenhouse gas 
emissions in these regards by granting permits to a coal-burning power 
plant, thus allowing it to operate.31 The government also impacts cli-
                                                                                                                      
21 See IPCC, supra note 15, at 5. 
22 See id. at 2. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. at 2–3. 
25 See Dave Owen, Climate Change and Environmental Assessment Law, 33 Colum. J. 
Envtl. L. 57, 66 (2008). 
26 See id. 
27 See World Meteorological Organization, What Human Activities Contrib-
ute to Climate Change? From Common Questions About Climate Change (1997), 
http://www.gcrio.org/ipcc/qa/04.html. 
28 See id. 
29 See Confirmed: Deforestation Plays Critical Climate Change Role, ScienceDaily, May 11, 
2007, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/05/070511100918.htm. Unfortunately, 
forests accumulate less carbon at higher temperatures. Id. Therefore, as climate change 
becomes more pernicious, existing forests will offset the warming pattern less effectively. 
See id. 
30 See World Meteorological Organization, supra note 27. 
31 See id. 
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mate change when it allows a developer to clear a forest, or permits an 
agricultural corporation to raise livestock where a forest once stood.32 
The activity that directly contributes to climate change exists only inso-
far as the government allows it.33 
 Government activity may have a more direct impact on climate 
change as well. Instead of merely licensing a coal-burning power plant, 
the government may fund its construction.34 The National Highway 
Administration could add lanes to a highway, thereby permitting it to 
accommodate more cars.35 The result might be an easing of traffic 
congestion, providing an incentive for more commuters to drive, thus 
generating an overall increase in carbon from fuel-burning vehicles.36 
In addition, the actual process of widening highways requires transport-
ing materials and using heavy equipment, which generate greenhouse 
gasses and contributes to climate change.37 These are only a few exam-
ples of ways in which government actions can contribute to climate 
change. 
II. The National Environmental Policy Act 
 The passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 
1970 introduced a distinct new model of statutory regulation which 
required federal agencies to consider the environmental consequences 
of their actions, and to disclose those consequences to the public.38 In 
drafting NEPA, Congress attempted to articulate the perception held 
by numerous Americans.39 Many believed the quality of the environ-
                                                                                                                      
32 See Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that approving or li-
censing a project is a federal action). 
33 See id. 
34 See Blue Ocean Pres. Soc’y v. Watkins, 767 F. Supp. 1518, 1520–21 (D. Haw. 1991) 
(noting that funding of a geothermal energy project was a federal action). 
35 See Audubon Naturalist Soc’y v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 524 F. Supp. 2d 642, 657, 708 
(S.D. Md. 2007) (noting that the Federal Highway Administration considered the effects 
of climate change in its decision to construct the Inter-County Connector as part of a lar-
ger part of Washington D.C.’s outer beltway). 
36 See James Kanter, Does Building New Roads Help or Hurt Global Warming?, Int’l Herald 
Trib., Dec. 5, 2007, at 13, available at http://www.iht.com/articles /2007/12/05/business/ 
greencol06.php. Although wider lanes may ease traffic jams, where idling cars burn excessive 
fuel and release more emissions, widening highways increases long-term greenhouse emis-
sions. Id. 
37 See Puget Sound Clean Air Agency, What Is Climate Change?, http://www. 
pscleanair.org/programs/climate/whatis.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). 
38 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, 
and Society 472 (3rd ed. 2004). 
39 See Lynton Keith Caldwell, The National Environmental Policy Act: An 
Agenda for the Future 1 (1998). 
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ment was deteriorating, and that federal legislation was needed to slow 
its decline.40 NEPA’s framers were concerned the “quality” of the envi-
ronment was both detrimental to people’s physical well-being, and 
damaging to the country’s ability to sustain natural resource exploita-
tion.41 
 NEPA’s drafters identified the failure of government agencies to 
consider the environmental repercussions of their activities as a signifi-
cant source of environmental degradation.42 Prior to NEPA, govern-
ment agencies had little reason to consider these repercussions.43 
Moreover, depending on an agency’s function, indulging in environ-
mental sensitivity could be either inefficient or downright untenable.44 
In fact, the Atomic Energy Commission—now the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission—considered its mandate of regulating nuclear energy to 
be irreconcilable with the environmental ideals of NEPA, and thus con-
tended it lacked the statutory authority to consider non-radiological 
environmental issues.45 However, NEPA’s drafters believed this negli-
gence was wreaking havoc on the environment.46 
A. Overview of NEPA 
 NEPA contains two primary sections—sections 101 and 102— 
which differ in the extent to which they impose duties on federal agen-
cies.47 Section 101, which itself is separated into section 101(a) and sec-
                                                                                                                      
40 See Oliver A. Houck, Is That All?, 11 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 173, 174 (2000) (re-
viewing Caldwell, supra note 39). 
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000) (including among its purposes the promotion of “efforts 
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate 
the health and welfare of man”). According to Senator Henry Jackson, former Chairman 
of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and primary drafter of NEPA, this 
environmental degradation included “haphazard urban growth, the loss of open spaces, 
strip-mining, air and water pollution, soil erosion, deforestation, faltering transportation 
systems, a proliferation of pesticides and chemicals, and a landscape cluttered with bill-
boards, powerlines, and junkyards.” See Caldwell, supra note 39, at 1. 
42 See Caldwell, supra note 39, at 1–2. 
43 See id. 
44 See Federal Highway Administration, Who We Are & What We Do, http://www. 
fhwa.dot.gov/whoweare/whoweare.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2009) (including “expand[ing] 
the Nation’s highway transportation system” among its strategic goals). 
45 See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 
1109, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
46 See Caldwell, supra note 39, at 1. 
47 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331–4332 (2000); 
Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review Under NEPA, 88 Harv. L. 
Rev. 735, 736–37 (1975) [hereinafter The Least Adverse Alternative Approach]. NEPA contains 
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tion 101(b), sets forth the Act’s basic substantive policies, but imposes 
no duties on agencies bound to comply with NEPA.48 Section 101 
enunciates vague policies, such as a requirement that the government 
“use all practicable means and measures” to protect environmental val-
ues.49 Courts have interpreted section 101 to impose no enforceable 
requirements on federal agencies.50 
 In contrast, section 102 does impose legally enforceable require-
ments on agencies and contains the procedural apparatus through 
which the goals are to be attained.51 Most notably, section 102 intro-
duces the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).52 Whenever a pro-
posed major federal action would have a significant impact on the 
environment, the responsible federal agency must prepare a state-
ment that details the anticipated impacts, as well as any alternatives 
that may avoid them.53 Once prepared, the EIS must be made avail-
able to the public.54 
 Interpretations of sections 101 and 102 come from two sources— 
the judiciary and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ).55 As 
this Note will show, the judiciary was largely responsible for breathing 
                                                                                                                      
several other sections as well. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4342. For instance, section 201 estab-
lishes the Council on Environmental Quality. Id. 
48 See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980); 
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 
(1978); Houck, supra note 40, at 178–79; Paul S. Weiland, Amending the National Environ-
mental Policy Act: Federal Environmental Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 12 J. Land Use & 
Envtl. L. 275, 288–89 (1997). 
49 See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a). Likewise, section 101(a) acknowledges “the profound im-
pact of man’s activity on . . . the environment” but does not require that man actually alter 
his activity. 42 U.S.C. § 4331; see Strycker’s Bay, 444 U.S. at 227; Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558. 
Similarly, section 101(b) declares a variety of environmental goals and a mandate that the 
federal government do what it can to achieve them. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331. 
50 See Houck, supra note 40, at 179. Nor does the preface to section 101 impose any 
burdens on agencies, stating, “The purposes of this Act are: To declare a national policy 
which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environ-
ment . . . .” See 42 U.S.C. § 4321. 
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332; Houck, supra note 40, at 178; see also Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinat-
ing Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding 
that the duties of section 102 are “not inherently flexible” and “must be complied with to 
the fullest extent”). 
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). 
53 See id. 
54 Id. 
55 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342–4344; see, e.g., Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. 
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (“[O]nce an agency has made a decision subject to NE-
PA’s procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to ensure that the agency has 
considered the environmental consequences.”). 
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life into56—and subsequently eviscerating the significance of—section 
101,57 while leaving section 102 procedural requirements largely in-
tact.58 The CEQ, established by section 201, is responsible for promul-
gating regulations that explain federal agencies’ obligations under 
NEPA.59 
1. Section 101—Unenforceable, Lofty Ideals 
 Section 101 is entitled “Congressional Declaration of National En-
vironmental Policy,” and it contains NEPA’s general substantive princi-
ples.60 Whether section 101 imposes any affirmative duties on federal 
agencies is a question nearly as old as NEPA itself,61 and to date, the 
answer appears to be an unequivocal no.62 For those who believe it 
does, however, NEPA grants courts the authority to review agencies’ 
decisions in order to make sure they comply with this substantive man-
date.63 The problem with this interpretation is that it has been unclear 
precisely what substantive requirements NEPA imposes.64 
                                                                                                                      
56 See Calvert Cliffs’, 449 F.2d at 1115. 
57 See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
558 (1978) (“NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its man-
date to the agencies is essentially procedural.”). 
58 See Strycker’s Bay, 444 U.S. at 227; Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558. 
59 Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (May 24, 1977). 
60 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332. For instance, section 101 of NEPA imposes on the federal gov-
ernment a responsibility to “use all practicable means . . . to the end that the Nation may 
. . . fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as a trustee of the environment for suc-
ceeding generations.” Id. This principle of stewardship for future generations inheriting 
the Earth and her resources is one of several principles section 101 of NEPA enunciates. 
Id. Others include: (1) assuring for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and estheti-
cally and culturally pleasing surroundings; (2) attaining the widest range of beneficial uses 
of the environment without degradation (3) preserving important aspects of our national 
heritage, and maintaining an environment which supports diversity and variety of individ-
ual choice (4) achieving a balance between population and resource use which will permit 
high standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s amenities; and (4) enhancing the qual-
ity of renewable resources and approaching the maximum attainable recycling of deplet-
able resources. Id. However precisely these principles enunciated the attitudes Americans 
held toward their environment, these statements have become nothing more than mere 
principles. See Houck, supra note 40, at 179–80. 
61 See The Least Adverse Alternative Approach, supra note 47, at 735 (discussing whether 
NEPA imposes substantive requirements in light of differing judicial interpretations a 
mere four years after NEPA’s passage). 
62 See Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1988); Strycker’s Bay, 444 
U.S. at 227; Weiland, supra note 48, at 289–90. 
63 See The Least Adverse Alternative Approach, supra note 47, at 742–43. 
64 See Houck, supra note 40, at 179. 
2009] Rethinking NEPA in Light of Climate Change 247 
 Before the Supreme Court had the chance to weigh in on the mat-
ter, one court proposed an answer.65 In 1971, just a little over a year af-
ter NEPA was passed, the D.C. Circuit Court held in Calvert Cliffs’ Coor-
dinating Committee v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission that the substantive 
language of section 101 required that a project be rejected where its 
environmental costs outweighed its benefits.66 According to Judge 
Wright’s majority opinion, NEPA establishes environmental protection 
as an integral part of an agency’s mandate.67 Not only did NEPA re-
quire an agency to include environmental impacts in its EIS, but it also 
required the agency to accord them proper weight in its decision-
making.68 Courts, meanwhile, had a “duty” to “see that the important 
legislative purposes [of section 101], heralded in the halls of Congress, 
[were] not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the Federal bu-
reaucracy.”69 This meant reviewing agency decisions to assure that they 
were not ignoring the environment.70 This interpretation breathed life 
into the substantive language of section 101.71 
 Although the Calvert Cliffs’ interpretation was later rejected by 
the Supreme Court, it was bolstered by the language of NEPA itself, 
which points out that laws and regulations “shall be interpreted and 
administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chap-
ter.”72 Indeed, one stated purpose of NEPA is to establish substantive 
standards for resolving conflicts between environmental interests and 
other values.73 Moreover, the Calvert Cliffs’ opinion cited to language 
explicitly within the statute in support of its holding—that the sub-
stantive requirements of section 101 be “administered to the fullest 
extent possible.”74 
                                                                                                                      
65 See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 
1109, 1114–15 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
66 See id. at 1115 (“[I]f the decision was reached procedurally without individualized 
consideration and balancing of environmental factors—conducted fully and in good 
faith—it is the responsibility of the courts to reverse.”); The Least Adverse Alternative Ap-
proach, supra note 47, at 742–43. 
67 See Calvert Cliffs’, 449 F.2d at 1112. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. at 1111. 
70 See id. at 1115. 
71 See Houck, supra note 40, at 182–83. 
72 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000); The Least Adverse Alternative Approach, supra note 47, at 739. 
73 See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a)(5); The Least Adverse Alternative Approach, supra note 47, at 
739. 
74 See 449 F.2d at 1114 (“‘[T]o the fullest extent possible’ sets a high standard for the 
agencies, a standard which must be rigorously enforced by the reviewing courts.” (quoting 
42 U.S.C. § 4332)); Houck, supra note 40, at 182–83. 
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 However, the interpretation of Calvert Cliffs’ was imperfect.75 
Commentators argued that a cost-benefit analysis was not justified by 
NEPA’s text.76 On the other hand, the alternative school of thought— 
agencies must only comply with NEPA’s procedural requirements—was 
thought by environmentalists to undermine NEPA’s intent.77 Unfortu-
nately for environmentalists, the Supreme Court was soon to oppose 
Calvert Cliffs’ interpretation of NEPA’s substantive burdens.78 A short 
series of decisions subsequently succeeded in whittling NEPA to its bar-
est procedural mechanisms.79 In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, the Supreme Court stated NEPA only 
“insure[s] a fully informed and well-considered decision [to proceed 
with the proposed action], not necessarily a decision the judges of the 
Court of Appeals or of this Court would have reached had they been 
members of the decisionmaking unit of the agency.”80 Although Ver-
mont Yankee did not preclude judicial review of compliance with NEPA’s 
substantive goals absolutely, in Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. 
Karlen, the Court declared: 
Once an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA’s proce-
dural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that 
the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it 
cannot “‘interject itself within the area of discretion of the ex-
ecutive as to the choice of the action to be taken.’”81 
In so holding, the Court barred the possibility of judicial review as a 
mechanism for implementing NEPA’s substantive goals.82 The grand 
legislative purposes expounded in section 101 were replaced by two 
humbler purposes described by the Supreme Court: “[NEPA assures] 
the agency . . . will have available . . . information concerning signifi-
cant environmental impacts; it also guarantees that the relevant infor-
mation will be made available to the larger [public] audience . . . .”83 
                                                                                                                      
75 See The Least Adverse Alternative Approach, supra note 47, at 746. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. at 739–40. 
78 See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980); 
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 
(1978); Weiland, supra note 48, at 290. 
79 See Strycker’s Bay, 444 U.S. at 227; Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 557–58; Weiland, supra note 
48, at 290. 
80 Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 58; Weiland, supra note 48, at 290. 
81 Strycker’s Bay, 444 U.S. at 227–28 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 
n.21 (1976)). 
82 See id.; Weiland, supra note 48, at 290. 
83 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). 
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2. Section 102—NEPA’s Action-Forcing Provision 
 In spite of this substantive amputation, NEPA’s procedural mecha-
nisms remained largely intact.84 As the Calvert Cliffs’ opinion stated, 
“the Section 102 [procedural] duties are not inherently flexible” and 
absent “a clear conflict of statutory authority,” they must be complied 
with to the fullest extent.85 In disagreeing with the reading expounded 
by Calvert Cliffs’—that NEPA imposes additional substantive require-
ments—the Strycker’s Bay Court reaffirmed NEPA’s procedural re-
quirements.86 This being so, NEPA—insofar as it has been enforced at 
all—has been enforced through its procedural requirements, which 
have been refined by the judiciary and by the CEQ.87 
a. The Requirements of Section 102 Are Apparent 
 The most important procedure established by section 102 is the 
requirement that an agency prepare an EIS wherever a major federal 
action will have a significant impact on the human environment.88 The 
statement must identify anticipated environmental impacts, as well as 
alternatives to the proposed action.89 Once prepared, the EIS must be 
made available to the public.90 
 The judiciary found less trouble interpreting and applying the 
procedures of section 102 than it had interpreting and applying sec-
                                                                                                                      
84 See Houck, supra note 40, at 188. 
85 See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 
1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
86 See Strycker’s Bay, 444 U.S. at 227 (“NEPA, while establishing ‘significant substantive 
goals for the nation,’ imposes upon agencies duties that are ‘essentially proce-
dural.’”(quoting Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558)); Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350; Weiland, supra note 
48, at 290. 
87 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342–4344 (2000); Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 
(May 24, 1977); Plater, supra note 38, at 478. 
88 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (requiring “all agencies of the Federal Government . . . [to] in-
clude in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major 
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed 
statement . . . on the environmental impact of the proposed action”); Michael B. Gerrard, 
Climate Change and the Environmental Impact Review Process, 22 Nat. Resources & Env’t 20, 
20 (2008). 
89 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). Furthermore, the statement must discuss “the relationship be-
tween local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement 
of long-term productivity” and “any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.” Id. 
90 Id. In addition to the public, a completed EIS must be made available to “the ap-
propriate Federal, State, and local agencies[,] . . . the President, [and] the Council on 
Environmental Quality.” Id. 
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tion 101.91 Whereas section 102’s procedural mandates are straight-
forward, section 101’s policy language is vaguely drafted and more 
difficult to apply.92 Unlike the so-called “requirement” of section 101 
that the federal government “attain the widest range of beneficial uses 
of the environment,” the requirement that a federal agency complete 
an EIS is straightforward and certain.93 A court may determine 
whether an agency complied with the procedural requirements of sec-
tion 102, but it cannot overturn an agency’s decision for failing to 
comport with section 101.94 As a result, agencies could comply with 
NEPA without choosing an environmentally prudent course of action, 
as long as they follow the statute’s procedures.95 
b. The Criteria for Compliance with Section 102 
 NEPA’s requirement that an agency prepare an EIS whenever 
“proposals for legislation and other major Federal action significantly 
affect[] the quality of the human environment” does not mean that 
the government must prepare an EIS every time it slightly alters the 
American landscape.96 NEPA requires an agency to prepare an EIS 
only where its proposed action constitutes a “major Federal action” 
that would have a “significant” effect on the “human environment.”97 
                                                                                                                      
91 See Ferester, supra note 9, at 208. 
92 See Houck, supra note 40, at 178–80. 
93 See 42 U.S.C. § 4331; Houck, supra note 40, at 179. Professor Houck draws a useful 
distinction between “principles” in this case, and “laws.” See Houck, supra note 40, at 179. 
According to him, laws—unlike principles—draw a clear line between “that which may be 
done and that which may not be done.” Id. Thus, while a declaration that highways shall 
not go through public parks is adequately precise to be law, a declaration that agencies 
shall “attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment” could either support 
or preclude the same behavior depending on its interpretation. See id. As another illustra-
tion, although one could argue whether a proposed action “preserv[es] important aspects 
of our national heritage” in accordance with section 101, there is less room for debate over 
whether a federal agency has included an EIS along with a proposal for a federal action. 
The agency either did or did not submit such a statement. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331; Houck, 
supra note 40, at 179–80. 
94 See Houck, supra note 40, at 181. 
95 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). 
96 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). In addition, there are numerous categorical exclusions 
where an agency may determine a particular activity is exempt from the EIS requirements. 
See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2007). In other cases there are categorical inclusions where an 
agency determines that a particular activity automatically requires the preparation of an 
EIS. E.g. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1419(d) (1980) (requiring 
an EIS be prepared when a permit is issued for certain underwater mining enterprises). 
97 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). 
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If an agency can demonstrate that its proposal would not qualify as 
such an action, it need not prepare an EIS.98 
 The circumstances under which an EIS is necessary, as well as the 
standards by which a court determines its adequacy, are determined 
by the courts99 and by the CEQ.100 The CEQ was created by section 
201 of NEPA.101 It promulgates regulations which are incorporated in 
the Code of Federal Regulations.102 Compliance with NEPA means 
complying with these regulations.103 
i. Major Federal Action 
 The language of NEPA itself does not define a “major Federal 
action.”104 The CEQ provided a broad definition which includes “ac-
tions with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to 
Federal control and responsibility.”105 The CEQ’s definition includes 
both an agency’s decision to act, as well as its decision not to act.106 
Major federal action includes projects “approved” by an agency as well 
as projects that are “entirely or partly financed, assisted, conducted, 
[or] regulated” by a federal agency.107 
 However, the definition is not all-encompassing. For instance, nei-
ther an agency’s decision to bring civil or criminal enforcement action, 
nor mere funding assistance are considered actions subject to NEPA.108 
                                                                                                                      
98 See id. 
99 See, e.g., Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 348–49 (1979) (holding that agencies 
are not required to prepare an EIS to accompany appropriation requests); Sugarloaf Citi-
zens Ass’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 959 F.2d 508, 512 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that purely ministerial acts do not fall under NEPA regulation). 
100 See Houck, supra note 40, at 184. NEPA created the CEQ and defined its role. See id. 
Initially, the CEQ was limited to conducting studies and advising the President on envi-
ronmental matters. See id. In time, it was empowered to issue “guidelines” —without the 
force of law—on points of NEPA interpretation. See id. In 1978, however, an executive or-
der empowered the agency to issue NEPA regulations with which agencies were bound to 
comply. See id. These regulations had the force of law. See id. Some criticized the members 
of the CEQ as being too friendly with certain industries, and promulgating regulations that 
were hostile toward environmentalism. See Houck, supra note 40, at 184. Regardless, the 
CEQ’s expanded role in promulgating rules for NEPA compliance has turned it into a 
formidable fixture of the NEPA landscape. See id. 
101 42 U.S.C. § 4342. 
102 See Houck, supra note 40, at 184. 
103 See id. 
104 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332. 
105 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2007) (emphasis added). 
106 Id. 
107 See id. § 1508.18(a). 
108 See id. 
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Additionally, case law suggests that nondiscretionary actions are beyond 
NEPA’s scope.109 An agency may succeed in demonstrating that an ac-
tion is not “Federal” if the agency cannot control the outcome of the 
project in material respects or if it has no discretion to exercise judg-
ment regarding the outcome.110 This is particularly relevant where fed-
eral agencies are not the primary actors.111 For example, the federal 
government can fund a project in its entirety, but if state or local agen-
cies make all the decisions, then it is not a federal action.112 
ii. Significant Effect on the Human Environment 
 In addition, NEPA requires that an EIS be prepared only where the 
proposed activity implicates “a significant effect on the human envi-
ronment.”113 “Effect” is broadly defined to include those which are “aes-
thetic, historic, cultural, economic, [or] social.”114 Determining whether 
an effect is “significant” is more challenging. An effect can be either 
singularly significant in itself, or individually minor but collectively sig-
nificant.115 The regulations also define “effects” to include both direct 
and indirect effects, though the effects must be reasonably foresee-
able.116 However, whether an effect is too remote to be ripe for NEPA 
consideration is left largely to the discretion of the agency.117 NEPA 
only requires that an agency act in good faith when it determines that 
                                                                                                                      
109 See South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir. 1980). 
110 See Save Barton Creek Ass’n v. Fed. Highway Admin., 950 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th Cir. 
1992). 
111 See id. 
112 See id. at 1135. 
113 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000). CEQ regulations define “human environment” in particu-
larly expansive terms. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (2007). In fact, the definition begins by stat-
ing that, “Human environment shall be interpreted comprehensively to include the natural and 
physical environment and the relationship of people with that environment.” Id. (empha-
sis added). Still, this definition has limits. See id. The regulations explicitly state that pro-
posals whose impacts are solely economic, social, or psychological do not need to be con-
sidered in an EIS unless the effects on natural and physical environment would otherwise 
necessitate preparation of an EIS. See id.; Metro. Edison v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 
460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983) (holding the Nuclear Regulatory Commission complied with 
NEPA although it didn’t contemplate psychological health damage). 
114 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2007). 
115 See id. § 1508.7. 
116 Id. § 1508.8. Direct effects are defined as those “which are caused by the action and 
occur at the same time and place.” Id. Indirect effects are “caused by the action and are 
later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable.” Id. 
117 See Custer County Action Ass’n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1039–40 (10th Cir. 2001). 
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an effect on the environment is too remote or speculative to qualify as 
significant.118 
 In Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanly II ), the Second Circuit held that two 
factors determine whether an effect will be significant.119 The first fac-
tor is context, and requires an agency or a reviewing court to compare 
the adverse environmental effects of a proposed action to activities ex-
isting in the affected area.120 The second factor is the intensity of the 
action’s adverse environmental effects.121 These factors are considered 
in concert with one another so that, “[w]here conduct conforms to ex-
isting uses, its adverse consequences will usually be less significant than 
when it represents a radical change.”122 The CEQ regulations adopt the 
standard articulated in Hanly II, and explicitly divide the inquiry into 
the “context” of the proposed action, and its “intensity.”123 
iii. EIS or FONSI? 
 In the absence of categorical inclusion or exclusion from the EIS 
requirement, an agency must complete an Environmental Assessment 
(EA) to evaluate the above criteria and determine whether an EIS is 
necessary.124 If not, an agency then prepares a Finding of No Signifi-
cant Impact (FONSI), in which case compliance with NEPA requires no 
further action.125 If there is a finding of significant impact, the agency 
can still prepare a FONSI, but it must state mitigation measures the 
agency will undertake that will reduce the impact to below the thresh-
                                                                                                                      
118 See id. 
119 See 471 F.2d 823, 830–31 (2d Cir. 1972) [Hanly II ]. 
120 See id. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. at 831. Hanly II gives an illuminating example of this two-part analysis: “one 
more highway in an area honeycombed with roads usually has less of an adverse impact 
than if it were constructed through a roadless public park.” Id. 
123 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (2007). 
124 See id. § 1508.9. Preparing an EA is a less formidable task than preparing an EIS. See 
id. The regulations define an EA as a concise public document that serves three functions. 
Id. It briefly provides evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an EIS, 
aids an agency’s compliance with NEPA when no EIS is necessary, and facilitates prepara-
tion of an EIS when one is necessary. Id. Furthermore, an EA includes brief discussions of 
the need for the proposal, alternatives, environmental impacts, and a list of agencies and 
persons consulted. Id. 
125 Id. § 1508.13. A FONSI is “a document by a Federal agency briefly presenting the 
reasons why an action . . . will not have a significant effect on the human environment and 
for which an environmental impact statement therefore will not be prepared.” Id. 
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old of “significance,” and it must implement these measures.126 Other-
wise, the agency must prepare an EIS.127 If the agency chooses to file an 
EIS instead of a FONSI subject to mitigation, the agency need not miti-
gate adverse environmental effects, or pursue a more environmentally 
sound alternative.128 Any EA, EIS, or FONSI prepared becomes a part 
of the public record.129 
 An agency’s decision to file a FONSI instead of an EIS may be 
challenged,130 but a court may require the agency to file an EIS only if 
it finds the agency’s initial decision “arbitrary and capricious.”131 
Where an EIS has been prepared, courts require only that an agency 
take a “hard look” at the alternatives included in the statement, in-
cluding the “no action” alternative, or status quo.132 To hold that an 
EIS is inadequate for failing to include an alternate course of action, a 
court must conclude the failure was arbitrary or capricious.133 Beyond 
that, courts have no authority to implement the substantive principles 
of NEPA.134 
B. Courts Require Agencies to Consider Climate Change 
 Litigants have attempted to force agencies to address the impacts 
of their activities on climate change by hauling them into court for 
failing to comply with NEPA.135 In so doing, some cases imply that a 
                                                                                                                      
126 See Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 733–34 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“An agency’s decision to forego issuing an EIS may be justified in some circumstances by 
the adoption of [mitigation] measures.”). 
127 See id. 
128 See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980); 
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 
(1978). 
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6 (2007). 
130 See Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1274 (10th Cir. 2004); Pla-
ter, supra note 38, at 487. 
131 See Greater Yellowstone Coal., 359 F.3d at 1274. 
132 See 40 C.F.R. § 1503.14; Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989). 
133 See Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1284–85 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding 
that the Forest Service’s failure to sufficiently explore all reasonable alternatives for pro-
posed expansion of a ski facility was arbitrary and capricious). 
134 See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 371; Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 
U.S. 223, 227 (1980); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519, 557–58 (1978). 
135 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508, 
513 (9th Cir. 2007); City of Los Angeles v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 
478, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Border Power Plant Working Group v. Dep’t of Energy, 260 F. 
Supp. 2d 997, 1028 (S.D. Cal. 2003). 
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thorough EA must include a discussion of climate change.136 If the EA 
reveals the impacts on climate change to be “significant,” the agency 
must file an EIS.137 In this regard, these actions have been increasingly 
successful.138 Although these successes may lead agencies to disclose 
climate change impacts, they have not led agencies to pursue alterna-
tive courses of action in order to avoid intensifying climate change.139 
 The first decision to address whether compliance with NEPA re-
quires an agency to discuss climate change impact was City of Los Angeles 
v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.140 This case addressed 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) pro-
posal to lower corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards.141 
Although the court held that the one-mile-per-gallon change in the 
CAFE standards was not significant enough to require an EIS, the court 
accepted that examining the effects of climate change was appropriate 
for a NEPA analysis.142 
 In another case dealing with CAFE standards, the Ninth Circuit 
explicitly endorsed the position that a proposed project’s impact on 
climate change must be considered in order to comply with NEPA.143 
Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion involved the reformulation of CAFE standards for light trucks.144 
The NHTSA concluded that its proposed change in standards would 
have no significant impact on the environment.145 This conclusion 
was made in spite of contrary evidence provided by the petitioners of 
                                                                                                                      
136 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 508 F.3d at 513; City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 493; Bor-
der Power, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 1028. 
137 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 508 F.3d at 552–53. 
138 See id. at 554; Border Power, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 1029. 
139 Haroff & Moore, supra note 13, at 166. 
140 See generally 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Gerrard, supra note 88, at 20. 
141 See Gerrard, supra note 88, at 20. 
142 See id. This case is also important because the court found the plaintiffs had stand-
ing to bring the lawsuit. See id. The ease with which courts have found that citizens have 
had standing to sue agencies under NEPA for failing to consider climate change has sur-
prised some commentators. See id. NEPA does not include a citizen suit provision, so claims 
must be brought under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Haroff & Moore, supra 
note 13, at 161. Citizen standing under NEPA is beyond the scope of this Note, as are the 
mechanics of the APA, but by way of cursory introduction, the plaintiff must show the fol-
lowing in order to have standing: (1) injury in fact; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the 
challenged action of the defendants; and (3) it is likely that the injury will be redressed by 
a favorable decision. Id. at 163–64. For a discussion of citizen standing in the context of 
NEPA and climate change, see Haroff & Moore, supra note 13, at 172–77. 
143 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508, 
550 (9th Cir. 2007). 
144 See id. at 520, 554. 
145 See id. at 554. 
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numerous scientific studies regarding the relationship between cli-
mate change and greenhouse gas emissions from light trucks.146 The 
court noted that light trucks accounted for about eight percent of 
greenhouse emissions in the United States, and that CAFE standards 
set by NHTSA would directly affect the net volume emitted.147 
 The court rejected the agency’s finding that the proposed stan-
dards would have no significant impact on the environment, and ruled 
that the agency’s decision to file a FONSI was arbitrary and capri-
cious.148 The court focused on NEPA’s “cumulative impacts” require-
ment—that individually minor but collectively significant impacts must 
be considered along with singularly significant impacts.149 Specifically, 
the court held “[t]he impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate 
change is precisely the kind of cumulative impacts analysis that NEPA 
requires agencies to conduct.”150 In light of this analysis, the court re-
quired the NHTSA to complete an EIS.151 
 If a litigant succeeds in persuading a court that an agency’s failure to 
consider climate change constitutes a failure to comply with NEPA, the 
agency is not required to actually mitigate its impact on climate 
change.152 For instance, in Border Power Working Group v. Department of En-
ergy the District Court held that the Department of Energy failed to 
comply with NEPA because it did not consider the impacts of carbon di-
oxide emissions, among a number of other considerations.153 Once the 
Department prepared an EIS in which it discussed the impacts of carbon 
emissions, however, compliance with NEPA was satisfied.154 The agency 
was not required to, nor did it, reduce its carbon dioxide emissions.155 
                                                                                                                      
146 See id. at 520–23. 
147 See id. at 522, 547. 
148 See id. at 554. 
149 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508, 
549 (9th Cir. 2007). 
150 See id. at 550. 
151 See id. at 558. 
152 See Gerrard, supra note 88, at 21; Haroff & Moore, supra note 13, at 166–67. 
153 260 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1029 (S.D. Cal. 2006). 
154 See id.; Gerrard, supra note 88, at 21; Haroff & Moore, supra note 13, at 166–67. 
155 See Gerrard, supra note 88, at 21; Haroff & Moore, supra note 13, at 166–67. 
Though a court may require that an agency consider climate change, the depth of its con-
sideration is left largely to the agency’s discretion. A good illustration of this is Mayo Foun-
dation v. Surface Transportation Board, 472 F.3d 545 (8th Cir. 2006). When the Surface 
Transportation Board filed an EIS pursuant to its approval of a 280-mile rail line from 
South Dakota to the Wyoming Powder River Basin, a group of environmentalists chal-
lenged it as inadequately addressing environmental impacts. See Mayo Foundation, 472 F.3d 
at 548–49; Gerrard, supra note 88, at 21. The Eighth Circuit agreed and directed the Board 
to consider increased greenhouse gas emissions that would result. See Haroff & Moore, 
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III. The California Environmental Quality Act 
 Because NEPA applies only to the federal government, numerous 
states have enacted similar statutes, aimed at curbing the environ-
mental impact of agency activity on the state and local level.156 Some of 
these were drafted more ambitiously than their parent statute NEPA.157 
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)—enacted shortly 
after NEPA—is among these.158 Both NEPA and CEQA were designed 
in order to require public agencies to consider and disclose the envi-
ronmental impacts of their actions.159 Their procedural mechanisms 
are also similar.160 CEQA, however, imposes substantive requirements 
on state and local agencies in addition to the procedural burdens.161 In 
particular, compliance with CEQA requires that an agency mitigate the 
environmental impacts of its activities whenever doing so is feasible.162 
This being so, CEQA can be utilized to require an agency to adopt al-
ternatives, or otherwise mitigate its impacts on climate change.163 
A. Overview of CEQA 
 Like NEPA, CEQA was drafted as a response to the perception 
that legislation was needed in order to curb the deterioration of the 
environment.164 And like NEPA, it begins by declaring its underlying 
policies.165 Whereas the inspiring policy language of NEPA is given 
                                                                                                                      
supra note 13, at 167–69. The Board filed a supplementary EIS where it paid cursory atten-
tion to the project’s impact on global warming, but the court concluded “the Board more 
than adequately considered the reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on the 
human environment.” See Gerrard, supra note 88, at 32; Haroff & Moore, supra note 13, at 
167–69 (internal citations omitted). 
156 See Gerrard, supra note 88, at 20. These “Mini-NEPAs” require their respective state 
and local agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their activities. See id. 
157 See California Environmental Quality Act, Cal Pub. Res. Code §§ 21000–21177 
(West 2007); Ferester, supra note 9, at 231. 
158 See Ferester, supra note 9, at 231. 
159 See id. at 209. 
160 See id. 
161 See id. at 233. 
162 See id.; Owen, supra note 25, at 76. 
163 See Owen, supra note 25, at 84. 
164 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2000) (“The Congress, recognizing the profound im-
pact of man’s activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment 
. . . declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to create . . . 
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony.”), with Cal Pub. 
Res. Code § 21000(a) (West 2007) (“The maintenance of a quality environment for the 
people of this state now and in the future is a matter of statewide concern.”). 
165 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21000. 
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little effect,166 CEQA contains unique procedural requirements that-
ensure courts enforce its substantive mandates.167 These requirements 
are notably absent from NEPA.168 
1. CEQA’s Substantive Mandate 
 The policies underlying CEQA are established by chapter one of 
the statute.169 The chapter begins with section 21000, which “finds and 
declares” a litany of seven promising but abstract legislative inten-
tions.170 In this regard, CEQA begins in a way similar to NEPA.171 CEQA 
distinguishes itself, however, in the section that follows.172 Section 
21001, “Additional Legislative Intent,” provides more specific guidance 
regarding compliance with CEQA.173 For instance, section 21001(f) 
states that it is the policy of the state to “[r]equire governmental agen-
cies at all levels to develop standards and procedures necessary to pro-
tect environmental quality.”174 Although this section might lack cer-
tainty sufficient to be useful in the context of judicial review,175 it 
indicates in no uncertain terms what is expected of California state and 
local agencies.176 
 As the statute progresses, its language continues to build the 
framework upon which CEQA’s procedural mechanisms are able to 
                                                                                                                      
166 See Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989); Strycker’s Bay 
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). 
167 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21002 (“[P]ublic agencies should not approve projects as 
proposed if there are feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures available which 
would substantially lessen the significant environmental effects of such projects.”). 
168 See Strycker’s Bay, 444 U.S. at 227 (1980); Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558 (1978). 
169 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 21000–21006. 
170 See id. § 21000. 
171 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2) (2000) (“[I]t is the continuing responsibility of the 
Federal Government to . . . assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and es-
thetically and culturally pleasing surroundings.”), with Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21000(b) 
(“It is necessary to provide a high-quality environment that at all times is healthful and 
pleasing to the senses and intellect of man.”). 
172 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21001; Ferester, supra note 9, at 232. 
173 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21001; Ferester, supra note 9, at 232. 
174 Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21001(f). 
175 See Houck, supra note 40, at 179. 
176 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21001(f); Ferester, supra note 9, at 232. Another illustra-
tion of this is in section 21001(c). This declares a state policy to, “[p]revent the elimina-
tion of fish or wildlife species due to man’s activities, [and] insure that fish and wildlife 
populations do not drop below self-perpetuating levels.” Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21001(c) 
(internal footnotes omitted). Although this does not forbid specific activities, if an agency 
is responsible for the reckless depletion of wildlife populations, it would appear to violate 
this provision. See id. 
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enforce its substantive mandate.177 The legislature explicitly stated that, 
in enacting CEQA, it intended agencies to implement either feasible 
alternatives to projects that would significantly impact the environment, 
or feasible mitigation measures to lessen the impact of projects.178 In 
1976, amendments to the statute made clear that if an agency could 
feasibly avoid significantly impacting the environment, the legislature 
expected it to do so.179 
2. CEQA’s Procedural Mechanisms 
 The specific legislative purpose behind enacting CEQA set the 
stage for uniquely effective procedural mechanisms.180 These proce-
dures practically guarantee that an agency will fail to comply with 
CEQA if its project significantly and unnecessarily impacts the envi-
ronment.181 In addition, CEQA retains the procedural requirements it 
inherited from NEPA; namely, that an agency must gather informa-
tion and disclose it to the public.182 
a. The Agency’s Duty to Disclose 
 CEQA requires that state and local agencies disclose to the public 
the adverse environmental impacts of their activities.183 The required 
disclosure mechanisms are similar to those of NEPA.184 When an 
                                                                                                                      
177 See id. § 21002. 
178 Id. 
179 See id. § 21002.1(b) (“Each public agency shall mitigate or avoid the significant ef-
fects on the environment of projects that it carries out or approves whenever it is feasible 
to do so.”) (emphasis added). This is an amendment to CEQA’s policy chapter, enacted in 
1976, that codifies early judicial decisions interpreting the policy language as imposing 
substantive requirements on agencies. See Ferester, supra note 9, at 237–38. In Friends of 
Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, the court relied on existing policy language to conclude 
that “if the adverse consequences to the environment can be mitigated, or if feasible alter-
natives are available, the proposed activity . . . should not be approved.” See 502 P.2d 1049, 
1059 (Cal. 1972); Ferester, supra note 9, at 237–38. 
180 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21002.1(b). 
181 See id. 
182 See Ferester, supra note 9, at 231–32. 
183 See Owen, supra note 25, at 76. 
184 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (C)(i) (2000) (requiring that an EIS accompany “every 
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment”), with Cal. Pub. Res. Code 
§ 21080(d) (requiring that an EIR be prepared “[i]f there is substantial evidence . . . that 
the project may have a significant effect on the environment”). 
Like NEPA, certain projects are statutorily exempt from CEQA analysis. Cal. Pub. Res. 
Code § 21080(b). Also like NEPA, non-discretionary actions are excluded. See id. In addi-
tion, section 21080(b) provides a litany of fifteen categorical exemptions. See id. These 
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agency proposes a project, it first performs an initial study to deter-
mine whether the project will have a significant impact on the envi-
ronment.185 Agencies prepare an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) 
where there is “substantial evidence” that the project it intends to ap-
prove or carry out may have a significant effect on the environ-
ment.186 In addition to the impacts of the proposed project, it must 
identify alternatives to the proposal and measures capable of mitigat-
ing the adverse impacts.187 
 An agency may file a Negative Declaration where the initial study 
indicates an EIR is unnecessary.188 The threshold determination is 
whether a proposed project will have a significant effect on the envi-
ronment.189 A Negative Declaration shall include a description of the 
project and disclose the findings of the initial study as well as the 
agency’s grounds for determining that no EIR is necessary.190 A Nega-
tive Declaration may also include mitigation measures the agency will 
implement in order to avoid potentially significant effects.191 This op-
tion allows an agency to comply with CEQA without filing an EIR, 
even where an initial study suggests the project may have a significant 
effect on the environment.192 Whether an agency prepares an EIR or 
a Negative Declaration, the prepared document becomes a part of the 
public record.193 
 CEQA does not require an agency to complete an EIR if the ef-
fect of its proposal is not “significant.”194 Likewise, an agency will not 
need to identify alternatives or mitigation measures absent a showing 
                                                                                                                      
include “[e]mergency repairs to public service facilities” and “[a]ctivities or approvals 
necessary to the bidding for, hosting or staging of . . . an Olympic games.” Id. 
185 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15063 (2007). 
186 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21080(d). 
187 See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15123; Owen, supra note 25, at 76. The following sub-
jects must be discussed in an EIR: “Significant Environmental Effects of the Proposed Pro-
ject[,] Significant Irreversible Environmental Changes Which Would be Involved in the 
Proposed Project Should it be Implemented[,] Growth-Inducing Impact of the Proposed 
Project[,] The Mitigation Measures Proposed to Minimize the Significant Effects[, and] 
Alternatives to the Proposed Project.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15126. 
188 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21080(c). “A public agency shall prepare . . . [a] negative 
declaration . . . for a project subject to CEQA when . . . [t]he initial study shows that there 
is no substantial evidence, in light of the whole record before the agency, that the project 
may have a significant effect on the environment.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15070(a). 
189 See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15063. 
190 See id. § 15071. 
191 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21080(c)(2). 
192 See id. 
193 See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15201. 
194 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21080(c). 
2009] Rethinking NEPA in Light of Climate Change 261 
of significance in its Negative Declaration.195 Nor will it need to im-
plement any mitigation measures.196 In other words, the proposal may 
proceed without the burden of preparing an EIR or altering its pro-
posal.197 Such an outcome will often be unlikely, however, because the 
definition of “significant” is highly inclusive of speculative impacts.198 
Significant impacts may be either “substantial,” or “potentially substan-
tial, adverse changes.”199 
 Furthermore, an environmental effect need not be direct to be 
considered “significant”; indirect physical changes in the environment 
may be significant as well.200 An agency must therefore consider those 
impacts that are not “immediately related to the project” as long as 
the impacts are “reasonably foreseeable.”201 Similarly, individually lim-
ited but “cumulatively considerable” effects are not exempt from a 
CEQA analysis either.202 These cumulative impacts can trigger the ob-
ligation to prepare an EIR or a Negative Declaration subject to mitiga-
tion measures.203 If the agency prepares an EIR, it must disclose the 
                                                                                                                      
195 See id.; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15071. 
196 See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15071. 
197 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21080(c). 
198 See id. § 21068. 
199 See id. (emphasis added). The regulations are equally inclusive of effects that are 
uncertain. “If there is substantial evidence, in light of the whole record before a lead agen-
cy, that a project may have a significant effect on the environment, the agency shall pre-
pare a draft EIR.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15064. 
200 See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15358. The regulations provide an illustration of indi-
rect physical changes to be considered. See id. § 15064(c). 
If a direct physical change in the environment in turn causes another change 
in the environment, then the other change is an indirect physical change in 
the environment. For example, the construction of a new sewage treatment 
plant may facilitate population growth in the service area due to the increase 
in sewage treatment capacity and may lead to an increase in air pollution. 
Id. 
201 See id. 
202 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21083(b)(2); Owen, supra note 25, at 77–78. A project 
will have a “significant” effect even if: 
[t]he possible effects of a project are individually limited but cumulatively 
considerable. As used in this paragraph, “cumulatively considerable” means 
that the incremental effects of an individual project are considerable when 
viewed in connection with the effects of past projects, the effects of other cur-
rent projects, and the effects of probable future projects. 
Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21083(b)(2). 
203 See Owen, supra note 25, at 77–78. 
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cumulative effects.204 If it opts to prepare a Negative Declaration, it 
must mitigate those effects.205 
b. The Duty to Pursue Alternatives or Mitigate Where Feasible 
 As section 21001.1 makes clear, the legislature intended compli-
ance with CEQA to require that an agency do more than merely ac-
knowledge the environmental impacts of its projects and disclose them 
to the public.206 Instead, the legislature intended that agencies “mitigate 
or avoid the significant effects on the environment of projects . . . 
whenever it is feasible to do so.”207 Where an initial study indicates that 
a project will significantly impact the environment, an agency may 
choose to prepare a Negative Declaration subject to mitigation meas-
ures.208 If it does not, CEQA’s procedures constrain the agency’s ability 
to proceed with the project as is.209 
 An EIR must identify and discuss all reasonable alternatives and 
mitigation measures which will avoid the project’s significant environ-
mental impact.210 This discussion is indispensable to CEQA compliance, 
and according to the California Supreme Court, it forms the “core” of 
an EIR.211 Only if these alternatives and mitigation measures are not 
“feasible” can an agency proceed with the project as is.212 “[E]conomic, 
environmental, social, and technological factors” determine the feasibil-
ity of a project.213 
 If an agency has determined that an alternative or mitigation 
measure is not feasible, CEQA requires the agency to issue a finding 
statement in which the agency enunciates why it decided to proceed 
                                                                                                                      
204 See id. 
205 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21080(c)(2). 
206 See id. § 21002.1. 
207 See id. 
208 See id. § 21080(c)(2). 
209 See id. § 21081. 
210 See id. § 21002; Owen, supra note 25, at 80. 
211 See Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 801 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Cal. 1990); 
Owen, supra note 25, at 80. 
212 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code at § 21081(a)(3). In addition, CEQA allows an agency to 
carry out a project that identifies significant environmental effects if it also finds 
“[c]hanges or alterations have been required in, or incorporated into, the project which 
mitigate or avoid the significant effects . . . [or] those changes or alterations are within the 
responsibility and jurisdiction of another public agency . . .” Id. at § 21081(a)(1)–(2). 
213 Id. § 21061.1 (“‘Feasible’ means capable of being accomplished in a successful 
manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into account economic, environmental, 
social, and technological factors.”). 
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with an unmitigated project in spite of the harm to the environment.214 
The agency must provide justification for the project that outweighs the 
resulting environmental damage.215 California courts often overrule 
agency decisions to implement actions where the responsible agency 
did not avoid significant environmental effects.216 Thus, agencies fre-
quently mitigate the significant impact of their activities, or implement 
environmentally sound alternatives in order to comply with CEQA.217 
B. CEQA and Climate Change 
 The procedures and policies above appear adequate to require 
agencies to adopt feasible alternatives or mitigation measures in order to 
avoid climate change.218 Indirect and cumulative environmental impacts 
must be considered in the initial study, and disclosed in either a negative 
report or an EIR.219 In Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, the Ninth Circuit commented that “[t]he 
impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change is precisely the 
kind of cumulative impacts analysis that NEPA requires agencies to con-
duct.”220 Although this was not a comment on CEQA’s cumulative im-
pact requirement, NEPA’s corollary is similar.221 CEQA requires, how-
ever, that significant cumulative impacts be mitigated wherever doing so 
is feasible.222 
                                                                                                                      
214 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code at § 21081; Ferester, supra note 9, at 234–35. 
215 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code at § 21081(b); Owen, supra note 25, at 82. 
216 See Owen, supra note 25, at 83. 
217 See id. 
218 See Owen, supra note 25, at 84. But see Gerrard, supra note 88, at 21–22 (noting that 
the only two challenges to projects’ exclusion of climate change impacts were rejected by 
the court, but also noting that the “court took pains to explain the narrowness of its rul-
ing”). 
219 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21083(b)(2)–(3); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15064(d) 
(2007); Owen, supra note 25, at 84. In addition, CEQA requires, “If there is . . . evidence 
. . . that the project may have a significant effect on the environment, an environmental 
impact report shall be prepared.” See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21080(d). This should dis-
suade courts from rejecting a CEQA argument on the grounds that global warming might 
not be real, or might not have anthropocentric causes. See id. 
220 See 508 F.3d 508, 550 (9th Cir. 2007). 
221 Compare 40 C.F.R § 1508.7 (2007) (“Cumulative impact is the impact on the environ-
ment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, 
present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions.”) (emphasis added), with Cal. Pub. 
Res. Code § 21083 (“‘[C]umulatively considerable’ means that the incremental effects of 
an individual project are considerable when viewed in connection with the effects of past 
projects, the effects of other current projects, and the effects of probable future pro-
jects.”). 
222 See Owen, supra note 25, at 83. 
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 There are promising signs that the California courts would echo 
the stance taken in Center for Biological Diversity.223 The Global Warm-
ing Solutions Act of 2006, passed in September of that year, is among 
the most ambitious legislative efforts to address climate change in the 
country.224 It requires that the state reduce its greenhouse gas emis-
sions to 1990 levels by 2020.225 Emissions in 1990 were approximately 
twenty-five percent less than they were in 2006.226 Even more ambi-
tiously, the governor stated in the Global Warming Solutions Act’s 
press release that he expected greenhouse gas emissions to be re-
duced to levels eighty percent below those of 1990 by the year 2050.227 
 To achieve this goal, the legislature subsequently passed Senate Bill 
97 (S.B. 97), which confirms that climate change is a subject for CEQA 
analysis.228 In addition, S.B. 97 requires the Governor’s Office of Plan-
ning and Research (OPR) to prepare “guidelines for the feasible miti-
gation of greenhouse gas emissions . . . .”229 These guidelines will pro-
vide agencies with clarity as to what CEQA requires when their 
proposals impact climate change.230 Failure to consider climate change 
in a CEQA analysis will create a cause of action for violating the stat-
ute.231 Passage of S.B. 97 was well timed.232 In 2007, California courts 
                                                                                                                      
223 See S. 97, 2007 Leg., 2007–08 Sess. (Cal. 2007). 
224 See Assemb. 32, 2006 Leg., 2005–06 Sess. (Cal. 2006); Press Release, Office of the 
Governor, Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Landmark Legislation to Reduce Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions (Sept. 27, 2006), available at http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/4111/. 
225 See Paul Shigley, 2008 Could Be the Year Everything Changes: State Efforts to Reduce 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Target Land-Use Policy, Cal. Plan. & Dev. Rep., Jan. 2008, at 1, 8 
[hereinafter 2008 Could Be the Year]. 
226 See id. 
227 Press Release, supra note 224. 
228 See 2008 Could Be the Year, supra note 225, at 8. 
229 S. 97, 2007 Leg., 2007–08 Sess. (Cal. 2007); see 2008 Could Be the Year, supra note 
225, at 8. Additionally, S.B. 97 requires the OPR to periodically update the guidelines to 
incorporate new information as it becomes available. S. 97, 2007 Leg., 2007–08 Sess. (Cal. 
2007). This is relevant as scientists’ understanding of climate change continues to develop. 
230 See S. 97, 2007 Leg., 2007–08 Sess. (Cal. 2007); Paul Shigley, Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Could Get Political from Outset, Cal. Plan. & Dev. Rep., Oct. 2007, at 3 [hereinafter Green-
house Gas Guidelines]. 
231 See S. 97, 2007 Leg., 2007–08 Sess. (Cal. 2007). The bill includes two exceptions 
where failure to consider climate change in a CEQA analysis will not create a cause of ac-
tion for violating the statute. See id. These are: (1) transportation projects funded under 
the Highway Safety, Traffic Reduction, Air Quality and Port Security Bond Act of 2006; and 
(2) projects funded under the Disaster Preparedness and Flood Prevention Bond Act of 
2006. Id. 
232 See Gerrard, supra note 88, at 21–22. 
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rejected two challenges to proposals where the responsible agencies 
neglected to consider the projected effects of climate change.233 
 Because these regulations will not go into effect until January 1, 
2010, the practical effect of S.B. 97 remains to be seen.234 A key question 
for these standards will be determining the point at which a project’s 
contribution to climate change becomes “significant” under CEQA.235 
Nonetheless, by passing S.B. 97, the California Legislature signaled that 
CEQA can effectively be used to address climate change.236 
IV. CEQA and Guidelines for Amending NEPA 
 CEQA, by way of legislative mandate, imposes two important obli-
gations on agencies: (1) they must not ignore climate change when 
considering the environmental impacts of their activities;237 and (2) 
they must avoid activities with significant environmental impacts if do-
ing so is feasible.238 Therefore, CEQA can be used to effectively ad-
dress climate change.239 NEPA, because it lacks similar requirements, 
is limited in its ability to do so.240 By comparing the two statutes, it is 
possible to identify possible modifications to NEPA that may allow it to 
effectively address climate change.241 Part A, below, advocates for an 
explicit legislative mandate that NEPA compliance requires considera-
tion of the impacts of climate change. Part B argues that NEPA will 
not effectively address climate change until agencies heed the substan-
tive policy language of section 101. This will require amending either 
NEPA itself, or the CEQ regulations, so that agencies are required to 
pursue feasible alternatives or mitigation measures where a proposed 
project contributes significantly to climate change.242 
                                                                                                                      
233 See id. 
234 See 2008 Could Be the Year, supra note 225, at 8; Greenhouse Gas Guidelines, supra note 
230, at 3; Kahn, supra note 4. 
235 2008 Could Be the Year, supra note 225, at 8; Greenhouse Gas Guidelines, supra note 230, 
at 3. 
236 See S. 97, 2007 Leg., 2007–08 Sess. (Cal. 2007). 
237 See supra Parts III.A.2.a, III.B. 
238 See supra Part III.A.2.b. 
239 See Owen, supra note 25, at 84. 
240 See Haroff & Moore, supra note 13, at 182. 
241 See infra Part IV.A–B. 
242 See infra Part IV.B. 
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A. Precisely the Kind of Analysis NEPA Requires Agencies to Conduct 
 Without legislation insisting otherwise, the impacts of climate 
change may elude NEPA analysis altogether. Efforts to use NEPA to 
litigate the causes of climate change are rising, but remain relatively 
untested.243 Neither Congress nor the CEQ has explicitly mandated 
that NEPA compliance requires agencies to consider the extent to 
which a proposed project will contribute to climate change.244 
 This may not be a problem, for climate change may be appropri-
ate for NEPA as the statute stands now.245 Currently, its procedures 
require that an agency prepare an EIS wherever a major federal ac-
tion would have a significant effect on the human environment.246 
Particularly relevant is the language that the Ninth Circuit seized on 
in Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admini-
stration—that agencies not ignore “individually minor but collectively 
significant actions taking place over a period of time.”247 
 Nonetheless, this interpretation should be codified, either by 
amending NEPA itself, or by amending CEQ regulations. It is true that 
the Ninth Circuit sounded unequivocal in its statement that “[t]he im-
pact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change is precisely the 
kind of cumulative impacts analysis that NEPA requires agencies to 
conduct.”248 In Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy 
Commission, however, another appellate court spoke in similarly certain 
terms about the need for courts to enforce the substantive language of 
section 101.249 There, Judge Wright declared courts had a “duty” to “see 
that important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, 
are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the Federal bureauc-
racy.”250 Without clear legislative language insisting otherwise, the Su-
preme Court disagreed with this interpretation and effectively stripped 
NEPA down to its barest procedural mechanisms.251 What is to stop Cen-
ter for Biological Diversity from suffering the same fate? 
                                                                                                                      
243 See Haroff & Moore, supra note 13, at 160. 
244 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2000); 40 
C.F.R. §§ 1500–1518 (2007). 
245 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508, 
550 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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247 40 C.F.R § 1508.7; see 508 F.3d at 550. 
248 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 508 F.3d at 550. 
249 See 449 F.2d 1109, 1111, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Houck, supra note 40, at 182–83. 
250 Calvert Cliffs’, 449 F.2d at 1111; see Houck, supra note 40, at 182–83. 
251 See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) 
(“[O]nce an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA’s procedural requirements, the 
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 By enacting S.B. 97, the California Legislature, on the other hand, 
left no doubt as to whether the effects of climate change should be 
considered in a CEQA analysis.252 This amendment to CEQA assures 
both agencies and courts that, in most circumstances, failure to con-
sider climate change will create a cause of action for violating the stat-
ute.253 S.B. 97 also shows the timeliness of enacting such a mandate: 
2007 saw California courts reject two challenges to proposals where the 
responsible agencies neglected to consider the projected effects of cli-
mate change.254 The fact that this occurred under a statute that is con-
sidered more ambitious than its federal counterpart underscores the 
importance of enacting a similar mandate applicable to  NEPA.255 
 In sum, whereas CEQA offers guidance as to what is expected of 
those forced to comply with it, NEPA fails to state explicitly that com-
pliance requires analyzing the impact of an agency’s activities on cli-
mate change.256 Likewise, CEQ regulations do not currently address 
the matter.257 The Ninth Circuit spoke forcefully in favor of applying 
NEPA to climate change,258 but in the absence of a legislative man-
date, the Supreme Court could decide otherwise.259 By explicitly de-
claring that NEPA will not permit agencies to ignore climate change, 
it can begin to effectively address the problem. 
B. Requiring Agencies to Avoid Climate Change 
 Unlike CEQA, a federal agency may comply with NEPA without 
avoiding the significant environmental impacts of its activity.260 If NE-
PA is to effectively address global warming, this must change. Where 
an EA indicates that a major federal action will significantly impact 
the environment, there is only one circumstance under which NEPA 
would require an agency to avoid the impact: if an agency chooses to 
prepare a FONSI subject to mitigation measures in lieu of completing 
                                                                                                                      
only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental conse-
quences.”). 
252 See S. 97, 2007 Leg., 2007–08 Sess. (Cal. 2007); Greenhouse Gas Guidelines, supra note 
230, at 3. 
253 See S. 97, 2007 Leg., 2007–08 Sess. (Cal. 2007). 
254 See Gerrard, supra note 88, at 21–22. 
255 See Ferester, supra note 9, at 209–10. 
256 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2000). 
257 See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500–1518 (2007). 
258 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508, 
550 (9th Cir. 2007). 
259 See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980). 
260 See supra Part II.A.2.b.iii. 
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an EIS, it must implement these measures.261 Otherwise, if the agency, 
after completing an EA, determines the project will result in a signifi-
cant impact, NEPA requires it to complete an EIS.262 The EIS must 
identify and discuss alternatives to the proposed action, but the agen-
cy is under no obligation to pursue an alternative, even if it is more 
environmentally sound.263 
 This is a far cry from CEQA, which requires agencies to avoid sig-
nificant environmental impacts if doing so is feasible.264 If an initial 
study indicates to an agency that its project will have a significant effect 
on the environment, the agency can either prepare an EIR, or a Nega-
tive Declaration subject to mitigation.265 If it chooses the former, it 
must identify and implement feasible alternatives or mitigation meas-
ures.266 Either way, CEQA makes it extremely difficult for an agency to 
implement a project that will significantly impact the environment.267 It 
must demonstrate that there are specific economic, social, technologi-
cal, or environmental factors that make avoiding the significant impact 
infeasible, and that the project is justified in spite of the environmental 
costs.268 
 For NEPA to effectively address climate change, it would need to 
adopt a similar approach to feasible alternatives and mitigation meas-
ures. As NEPA stands now, a federal agency could, subsequent to find-
ing that its project significantly impacted climate change, avoid miti-
gating the impact simply by opting to prepare an EIS instead of a 
FONSI subject to mitigation.269 CEQA’s approach, on the other hand, 
limits the ability of an agency to significantly impact climate change 
wherever it is feasible to avoid doing so.270 
 With NEPA there is another twist, because an agency is under no 
obligation to even consider alternatives that would avoid climate 
change unless it prepares an EIS.271 The decision of whether to com-
plete an EIS lies with the responsible agency, the threshold determi-
                                                                                                                      
261 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13; Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 
733–34 (9th Cir. 2001) (“An agency’s decision to forego issuing an EIS may be justified in 
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262 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2000). 
263 See supra Part II.A.2.b.iii. 
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266 See Ferester, supra note 9, at 234. 
267 See id. 
268 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21061.1; Ferester, supra note 9, at 234. 
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nation being whether the project is a major federal action that will 
significantly impact the environment.272 It has wide discretion to 
choose to file a FONSI instead. 273 If the agency chooses not to file an 
EIS, a reviewing court may overturn the agency’s decision to prepare 
a FONSI only if it determines it was arbitrary and capricious.274 
 An agency could avoid preparing an EIS by demonstrating that no 
“significant effect” would result from the project.275 This may be par-
ticularly tempting in the context of greenhouse gas emissions because, 
as the regulations make clear, determining whether environmental im-
pacts are significant is a question of both “context” and “intensity.”276 As 
the court in Hanly v. Kleindienst stated “one more highway in an area 
honeycombed with roads usually has less of an adverse impact than if it 
were constructed through a roadless public park.”277 Highways, how-
ever, contribute to climate change wherever they are located.278 Unlike 
other types of pollution, the location of greenhouse gas emissions mat-
ters little.279 The “roadless public park” will not be spared the conse-
quences of climate change simply because it is not the source of green-
house gas emissions.280 Imagine the impact on climate change if a 
location were deemed to be the appropriate “context” in which to op-
erate several coal-burning power plants. 
                                                                                                                      
272 See Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1274 (10th Cir. 2004); Du-
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ence: The Road Forward: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Transp. and Infrastructure, 110 Cong. 
(2007) (testimony of Gregory M. Cohen, P.E. President and C.E.O., American Highway Users 
Alliance), available at http://www.highways.org/pdfs/climate_testimony5-16-07.pdf (testi-
mony submitted to Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure) (explaining that the use of high-
ways contributes to climate change and proposing solutions to reduce the greenhouse gasses 
emitted through highway use). 
279 See Owen, supra note 25, at 66–67. 
280 See id. 
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 Again, S.B. 97 may provide an answer. Pursuant to this legislation, 
the OPR must prepare “guidelines for the feasible mitigation of green-
house gas emissions.”281 When these go into effect in 2010, this will cre-
ate certainty for agencies required to comply with CEQA, and for 
courts reviewing their decisions.282 Time will tell just how effectively 
these guidelines address climate change, and how successfully the OPR 
determines the line between a “significant effect” on climate change 
and an “insignificant” one.283 Regardless, some indication of the point 
where greenhouse gas emissions become intolerable would provide 
better guidance to agencies than none. 
 Congress should follow California’s lead and require the CEQ to 
promulgate similar guidelines. In so doing, it will ensure that—at 
some point decided on by Congress and the CEQ—an agency’s con-
tribution to climate change will require an EIS. By further amending 
the statute to require agencies to avoid contributing to climate 
change where doing so is feasible, the country will have an effective 
weapon at its disposal to fight the human causes of global warming. 
Conclusion 
 As research continues to confirm the severe, detrimental effects of 
climate change, as well as the human causes of this phenomenon, the 
need for regulation is increasingly being accepted as a foregone con-
clusion. Such regulation is relatively new, and the consensus among 
many appears to be that it is lacking on the federal level. As a result, 
numerous states have attempted to fill in this regulatory vacuum. Cali-
fornia is among these states, and has been a leader in enacting progres-
sive policies that can be utilized effectively to combat climate change. 
The proposal of Assembly Bill 32 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
to below 1990 levels is among the most ambitious in the country. 
 However, climate change is a unique environmental predicament 
that may be more effectively addressed on the federal level than on 
the state level. NEPA has the potential to be one statutory tool in the 
fight against global warming. Unfortunately, as it now stands, a federal 
agency can comply with NEPA while at the same time contributing 
adversely to climate change. Though an agency’s impact on climate 
change appears to be ripe for NEPA analysis, there is no confirming 
this. As such, the appropriateness of climate change as a subject for 
                                                                                                                      
281 See S. 97, 2007 Leg., 2007–08 Sess. (Cal. 2007). 
282 See Greenhouse Gas Guidelines, supra note 230, at 3. 
283 See id. 
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NEPA analysis may be left to the very agencies whose environmental 
impacts NEPA was intended to curb. Furthermore, NEPA requires on-
ly that an agency be fully informed about, and disclose, the environ-
mental impacts of its actions. NEPA leaves unchecked the ability of 
agencies to disregard climate change impacts, even where an agency 
is aware of them. 
 CEQA, on the other hand, may prove to be an effective tool in 
regulating human contributions to climate change. It is bolstered by 
both a clear legislative mandate to mitigate whenever doing so is feasi-
ble, and by legislative confirmation that compliance with CEQA re-
quires consideration of a project’s impact on climate change. In order 
for NEPA to effectively address climate change, legislators should exam-
ine one of the statute’s most ambitious protégés—CEQA. By insisting 
that NEPA compliance requires agencies to consider climate change, 
and by requiring them to avoid activities which significantly contribute 
to it, NEPA will bear a striking resemblance to CEQA and will be a 
more effective tool in combating this critical environmental crisis. 
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